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Abstract The paper presents a new scenario-based decision rule for the classical
version of the newsvendor problem (NP) under complete uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty
with unknown probabilities). So far, NP has been analyzed under uncertainty with
known probabilities or under uncertaintywith partial information (probabilities known
incompletely). The novel approach is designed for the sale of new, innovative products,
where it is quite complicated to define probabilities or even probability-like quantities,
because there are no data available for forecasting the upcoming demand via statistical
analysis. The new procedure described in the contribution is based on a hybrid of
Hurwicz and Bayes decision rules. It takes into account the decision maker’s attitude
towards risk (measured by coefficients of optimism and pessimism) and the dispersion
(asymmetry, range, frequency of extremes values) of payoffs connectedwith particular
order quantities. It does not require any information about the probability distribution.
Keywords Newsvendor problem · Complete uncertainty · Scenario-based decision
rule · Risk aversion · One-shot decision · Innovative products
1 Introduction
The newsvendor problem (NP), also known as the single-period problem (SPP) or
the newsboy problem, consists in finding the order quantity which maximizes the
expected profit (orminimizes the expected loss) in a single period probabilistic demand
framework. This topic has attracted a great deal of attention and played a central
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role at the conceptual foundations of stochastic inventory theory. It was originally
related to DMSU (decision making under stochastic uncertainty) or DMR (decision
making under risk) where the demand is presented as a random variable with a known
probability distribution. NP has been already analyzed on diverse assumptions and
with various extensions (Choi 2012). Additionally, this problem has been also recently
discussed in the context of DMPI—decision making with partial information (Guo
2011, 2013; Guo andMa 2014), where the decisionmaker (DM) is able to subjectively
define possibility degrees and satisfaction levels (the probability distribution is not
known completely).
Nevertheless, according to Benzion et al. (2010), newsvendor theory should not
assume that theDM faces a known distribution, since in real-life situations, the demand
distribution is not always known. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that know-
ing probabilities does not necessarily lead the subject closer (than that one who is
unaware of the underlying demand distribution) to the optimal solution or to improve
profits, see also (Besbes and Muharremoglu 2013). Therefore, the investigation of NP
under complete uncertainty, i.e. with unknown probabilities (Knight 1921; Courtney
et al. 1997; Sikora 2008; Trzaskalik 2008; Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Walliser
2008), ismuch desired. Especially in the case of new (innovative) product development
where it is quite complicated to define probabilities or even probability-like quantities,
because there are no data available for forecasting the upcoming demand via statistical
analysis, see also Millet (2009). It is worth emphasizing that the avoidance of proba-
bility in the case of newsvendor problem with innovative products is consistent with
von Mises concept (von Mises 1998) who states that the probability of single events
cannot be expressed in numbers.
Classical newsvendormodels are usually based upon the assumption of risk neutral-
ity (Khouja 1999; Lee and Nahmias 1993; Porteus 1990; Sikora 2008). Meanwhile,
recently there is a growing body of literature that attempts to use alternative risk
preferences rather than risk neutrality to describe the newsvendor decision-making
behavior (Agrawal and Seshadri 2000; Guo and Ma 2014; Kamburowski 2014; Lee
et al. 2014; Wang andWebster 2009; Wang et al. 2009, 2012; Wu et al. 2013b). In this
contribution, we also take into account the DM’s attitude towards risk. That means
that the solution recommended for a particular DM depends on two factors: the target
objectively defined (profit maximization) and the DM’s nature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the main features of the
traditionally understood NP. Section 3 defines a new problem—the newsboy problem
under complete uncertainty for innovative and small life cycle products. Section 4
presents a 2-criteria decision rule that may be used as a tool in searching an appropriate
solution for the problem aforementioned. Section 5 provides illustrative examples.
Section 6 analyzes the usefulness of other possible approaches in comparison with the
approach presented in the contribution. Conclusions are gathered in the last part.
2 Newsvendor problem
The classical newsvendor problem constitutes a production/procurement problem of
a retailer who sells a product under random demand without keeping inventory. There
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are many situations in practice where keeping a product in inventory for future use is
either impossible or impractical. This is the case for products such as newspapers and
perishable food. A similar situation arises when an apparel retailer makes orders at
the beginning of the season for a fashion item. Such orders are made for one season
(sales time window) only, and any unsold (leftover) items are not kept in inventory to
be sold next year. They are rather sold at deep discounts at the end of the season. Thus,
in NP the retailer places an order for a product to his own supplier at the beginning
of each period and the quantity procured is used solely to satisfy the demand during
the current period. No inventory is kept from one period to the next (Burnetas et al.
2007). The demand for this product during the current period is not known in advance,
but it is represented by a nonnegative random variable D with a known probability
distribution. The cumulative distribution function of D is F , i.e. P(D ≤ x) = F(x).
The distribution may be:
– continuous (uniform, normal, lognormal, exponential), e.g. the endpoints of the
interval with possible values of the demand are equal to Dmin = 10 and Dmax =
25, or
– discrete (the demand takes a finite and countable number of values), e.g. P(D =
1) = 0.3; P(D = 2) = 0.4; P(D = 3) = 0.2; P(D = 4) = 0.1.
The goal of NP may consist in expected profit maximization or expected loss mini-
mization. Here we focus on problems with discrete demand distributions and expected
profit maximization, which are described for example in (Sikora 2008). We assume
that c1 is the unit production/purchase cost of the product. Symbol c2 denotes the
selling price (full retail price) of this product and c3 stands for the discount price
(price of leftover items/salvage value), where c3 < c1 < c2. Symbol q signifies the
quantity of supply (order quantity) and this is the decision variable. Values of c1, c2,
c3 allow one to calculate the unit profit (profit margin) from selling the product at
price c2: b = c2 − c1, and the unit loss from selling it at price c3: s = c1 − c3.
Equation (1) enables one to compute profit g(q, D) gained by the retailer when the
supply equals q and the demand is equal to D. Expected profit p(q) is given by Eq.
(2), where Dmin = qmin and Dmax = qmax are the minimal and maximal quantity of
demand considered by the retailer and P(D) is the probability that the demand will
be equal to D. NP consists in determining q∗ which satisfies Eq. (3). In the case of
discrete demand distributions, this problem may be solved by means of a profit matrix
(Table 1), a recurrence equation (Eq. 4) or a critical ratio (Eq. 5), see Sikora (2008). In
the recurrence equation the expected profit for q (i.e. p(q)) depends on the expected
profit for q − 1 (i.e. p(q − 1)), the unit profit b, the unit loss s and the distribution
function of Dwhen the demand equals q − 1 (i.e. F(q − 1)). When computing p(q)
for increasing values of q according to Eq. (4) we stop calculations when p(q) starts
to decrease since that means that the maximal expected profit has just been reached.
The critical ratio is formulated on the basis of the recurrence equation. In the critical
ratio, first ratio b/(s + b) is calculated and then one has to find such a value of q for
which this ratio is at least equal to F(q∗ − 1) and at most equal to F(q∗).
g(q, D) =
{
b · q if q ≤ D ,















































































































































































































































bq, i f q = Dmin,
p(q − 1) + b − (b + s)F(q − 1), i f q > Dmin. (4)
F(q∗ − 1) ≤ b
b + s ≤ F(q
∗) (5)
Extended newsvendor models are variations of the classical newsvendor model
involving different objectives, utility functions, supplier pricing policies, newsvendor
pricing policies, discounting structures, states of information about demand and sup-
ply, constrained multi-products, multiple-products with substitution, random yields,
multi-locationmodels and different multiple production cycles (Agrawal and Seshadri
2000; Behret and Kahraman 2010; Choi 2012; Dogru et al. 2013; Gallego and
Moon 1993; Goto 2013; Kamburowski 2014; Khouja 1999; King and Wallace 2012;
Kocabıyıkog˘lu and Popescu 2011; Petruzzi et al. 2009; Qin et al. 2011; Wang et al.
2009, 2015; Wu et al. 2013a, b).
3 Newsvendor problem under complete uncertainty
We have alreadymentioned that in the case of new products, no relevant historical data
are available for statistical demand analysis. And, as it was noticed in the introduction,
Benzion et al. (2010) and Besbes andMuharremoglu (2013) underline the necessity to
solve NP with an unknown distribution because such a problem much more suits real-
life situations. Benzion et al. (2010) lead a behavior comparative analysis concerning
decision makers aware of the underlying demand distribution and decision makers
unaware of that distribution. Besbes and Muharremoglu (2013) as well as Godfrey
and Powell (2001) propose some methods for the repeated newsvendor problem with
unknown probabilities. In this paper wewill investigate the non-repeated NP for which
the probability distribution is not known (due to innovative products). Such a problem
has not yet been discussed in the literature.
When solving the non-repeated NP with unknown probabilities, one can refer to
decision making with partial information, where the probability distribution is not
known completely, but the demand may be characterized by possibility distributions
(Guo and Ma 2014). Another approach consists in assuming that the decision is made
under complete uncertainty (DMCU), which facilitates the decision making process,
since this time it is not necessary to estimate probability-like quantities.
In the case ofDMCU, the only parameter that should be declared (ifwe intend to take
into consideration DM’s preferences) is the coefficient of optimism (or pessimism).
The second benefit of applying DMCU to NP is the possibility to combine NP with
scenario planning (Pomerol 2001; Heijden 1996), because within the framework of the
newsboy problem the profitmatrix can be computed in a very preciseway (see Table 2).
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factors: which decision will be selected and which scenario will occur. Thus, NP under
complete uncertainty may be defined by means of a scenario-based decision model
with m states of nature (scenarios, events): S1, …, Si , …, Sm , n possible alternatives
(decisions, strategies, order quantities): A = {A1, . . ., A j , . . ., An}, and n×m profits
(ai, j—profit gained by the retailer if state Si occurs and alternative A j is selected)
calculated according to formula (6). The distributions of payoffs are discrete. Symbols




b · q , if j ≤ i ,
b · D − s(q − D) , if j > i . (6)
We assume that NP for new products may be an uncertain problem where a suitable
pure (not mixed) strategy has to be found. In the case of pure strategies, the DM
chooses and completely executes only one alternative. On the other side, a mixed
strategy implies that the DM selects and performs a weighted combination of several
accessible alternatives, see e.g. bonds portfolio construction, cultivation of different
plants (Officer and Anderson 1968; Puppe and Schlag 2009; Sikora 2008).
There are many classical and extended decision rules designed for DMU (see
e.g. Basili et al. 2005, 2008; Basili 2006; Basili and Chateauneuf 2011; Ellsberg
2001; Etner et al. 2012; García et al. 2012; Gaspars-Wieloch 2013, 2014a, b, c, d, e,
2015a, b, d, e, f; Ghirardato et al. 2004; Gilboa 2009; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989;
Hayashi 2008; Hildebrandt and Knoke 2011; Hurwicz 1952; Ioan and Ioan 2011;
Marinacci 2002; Pereira et al. 2015; Perez et al. 2015; Piasecki 1990; Savage 1961;
Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wald 1950). The most known classical procedures are
maximax (the optimist model), maximin (the pessimist model—Wald rule), minimax
(the regret model, Savage rule), model of realism (Hurwicz rule) and Laplace criterion
(model of the average, Bayes rule).
It is worth emphasizing that some of those rules (e.g. Gaspars-Wieloch 2013,
2014a, c, d, 2015b, c; Hayashi 2008; Hurwicz 1952; Ioan and Ioan 2011; Savage 1961;
Wald 1950) find application when the DM intends to perform the selected strategy
only once, see one-shot decisions. Others are recommended for people contemplating
realization of the chosen variant many times (multi-shot decisions), e.g. Bayes rule.
In the NP case with innovative and small life cycle products we certainly deal with
one-shot decisions.
Some decision rules allow the DM to take into consideration his or her level of
optimism (e.g. Ellsberg 2001; García et al. 2012; Gaspars-Wieloch 2014d, 2015b;
Hurwicz 1952; Perez et al. 2015). Others do not give such opportunities (e.g. Hayashi
2008; Savage 1961; Wald 1950), which may be treated as a disadvantage in the case
of solving the newsvendor problem under uncertainty, i.e. when future parameters are
not deterministic and each decision maker has a different, individual nature.
Many extended rules mentioned above refer to the probability calculus, which
is rather characteristic of DMR—decision making under risk, or DMU with known
probabilities. Let us remind that in this paper we focus on the Knight’s definition,
according to which uncertainty occurs when we do not know (i.e. we can not mea-
sure) the probabilities of particular scenarios (see complete uncertainty). Therefore,
procedures presented for instance in Ellsberg (2001), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
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or Tversky and Kahneman (1992) cannot be applied to the uncertain version of the
newsvendor problem.
As a matter of fact, there is no unanimity in defining uncertainty. According to the
first approach (see: theory of decision) the DM may choose the appropriate decision
under certainty (DMC—each parameter of the problem is deterministic), under risk
(DMR), with partial information (DMPI), under complete uncertainty (DMCU) or
under total ignorance (DMTI). In the case of DMR, DMPI and DMCU, possible
scenarios are predicted by experts or the DM. DMCU occurs when the probability of
those events is not known or when the DM does not want to make use of the estimated
probabilities. If the likelihood of particular scenarios is known and significant for
the DM, then we deal with DMR (Haimann et al. 1985; Kaplan and Barish 1967;
Knight 1921; Perez et al. 2015; Sikora 2008; Trzaskalik 2008). DMPI is characterized
by partially known probabilities (Kmietowicz and Pearman 1984; Kofler and Zweifel
1993), whichmeans that theDMknows only a) the order of scenarios or b) the intervals
with possible probabilities for each scenario. DMTI concerns problems for which the
DM is not able to define possible events.
Supporters of the second approach (see: theory of economics) state that uncertainty
involves all situations with non-deterministic parameters, while risk means the possi-
bility that some bad circumstances happen (potential of losing something), see Birge
and Louveaux (2011); Dominiak (2009); Dubois and Prade (2012); Fishburn (1984);
Ogryczak and Sliwinski (2009).
In this paper we treat uncertainty according to the first approach just to distinguish
different degrees of probability knowledge, but in such expressions as “risk neutrality”,
“risk aversion”, “attitude towards risk” we refer to the second approach.
In the next section we make an attempt to find an appropriate decision rule for the
classical version of the newsvendor problem under complete uncertainty (NPCU).
4 Two-criteria (H+B) rule for NPCU
When selecting a suitable procedure for NPCU (the likelihood of particular states is
unknown) we must remember that the method should consider the DM’s nature in
the decision making process. Furthermore, it is recommended to take into account the
specific structure of the profit matrix of the classical NP. Table 3 presents profits for
three possible cases (b > s, b = s, b < s), which can occur in real world situations.
The first case may take place for instance when the discount price is almost equal to
the purchase cost (i.e. we can recover almost the whole expenditure) and the selling
price significantly exceeds the purchase (or production) cost. The first case constitutes
a frequent and very advantageous situation for the newsvendor. The second case takes
place when the difference between c1 and c3 equals the difference between c2 and c1.
Such a situation is also advantageous, but to a lower extent. The third case occurs e.g.
when the discount price is visibly lower than the purchase cost (i.e. we can recover only
a part of the whole expenditure) and the selling price is almost equal to the purchase
(or production) cost. The last situation is the least advantageous and occurs e.g. in
the case of perishable food. Conclusions concerning the specific structure of the profit
matrix of the classical NP are as follows:
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Table 3 Examples of profitmatrix for NP under complete uncertainty (qmin = Dmin = 1, qmax = Dmax =
4). Source: Gaspars-Wieloch (2015c)
Examples I. b = 5, s = 1 II. b = 3, s = 3 III. b = 1, s = 5
Sc.\ alt. A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4 A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 5 4 3 2 3 0 −3 −6 1 −4 −9 −14
S2 5 10 9 8 3 6 3 0 1 2 −3 −8
S3 5 10 15 14 3 6 9 6 1 2 3 −2
S4 5 10 15 20 3 6 9 12 1 2 3 4
(a) for bsufficiently bigger than s, the average of payoffs is the highest for q = qmax ,
(b) for b sufficiently smaller than s, the average of payoffs is the highest for q = qmin ,
(c) for q = qmin , particular profits ai, j are always the same (regardless of the state)—
hence, the value of the profit is certain for decision A1,
(d) almost all alternatives have more than one profit equal to a j,max and the number
of such profits increases for q close to qmin—the higher q is, the less certain value
a j,max is,
(e) for each decision, particular profits a1, j , …, ai, j , …, am, j are always ordered
in the form of a non-decreasing sequence, which means that the sets of payoffs
achievable across the states almost do not overlap in the top right-hand corner of
the matrix,
(f) the range between a j,min and a j,max is an increasing function f (q).
In connection with all those factors, we can conclude that decision rules formulated
by Wald, Hurwicz, Savage, Bayes and Hayashi should not be applied to NPCU (due
to the lack of possibility to consider DM’s nature, the lack of application to one-shot
decisions, irrational solutions in the case of asymmetric distributions of payoffs or not
overlapping sets of payoffs for particular scenarios, etc., compare with the justification
presented in Gaspars-Wieloch (2012, 2014a, c) and Perez et al. (2015).
Therefore, we use in this paper a less-known extended procedure devoted to DMU,
i.e. a hybrid of Hurwicz and Bayes rules (H+B rule), which is described in detail
in Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a, 2015a). This method, thanks to parameters α ∈ [0, 1]
(the coefficient of pessimism is close to 1 for extreme pessimists—risk averse behav-
iour) and β = 1 − α ∈ [0, 1] (the coefficient of optimism is close to 1 for radical
optimists—risk prone behaviour), takes into account DM’s preferences. Both coef-
ficients are not measures of probability—they just subjectively present someone’s
behaviour (attitude). In the H+B rule, in contradiction to the Hurwicz, Wald, Hayashi,
Savage approaches, all outcomes have an influence on the value of the final measure,
which is quite advantageous for cases where alternatives contain many profits almost
equal to extreme values. The final measure is a weighted average of all payoffs and
weights depend on the DM’s nature. The general idea of H+B is to assign, for a pes-
simist, α to the last term of the non-increasing sequence of all payoffs related to a
given decision and β to the remaining terms of that sequence. For an optimist, weights
are set in a different way: β is connected with the first term of the sequence and α
with the remaining ones. Due to the fact that, in the newsvendor problem, the ranges
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of profits related to particular alternatives vary rather significantly, we will support
the H+B rule for NPCU with an additional auxiliary decision tool, which analyzes
the deviations between outcomes (Gaspars-Wieloch 2015c). The use of the standard
deviation as a supplementary tool in the scenario-based decision making process has
been also proposed for instance by Ioan and Ioan (2011) and Piasecki et al. (2013).
The second criterion (standard deviation, see Eqs. 11–12, step 7) is introduced in the
final step of the procedure in order to find a relatively safe strategy (i.e. an alternative
with a relatively small range of payoffs and with as little negative payoffs as possible),
which is especially crucial in the case of cautious DMs. The deviation criterion is only
applied to decisions with the highest index hb j . However, if there are other decisions
with indices very close to the highest one, we recommend to calculate and compare
the value of the second measure for the whole subset containing the best strategies
according to the first criterion. We purposely do not define the acceptable distance
between the highest index hb j and the other ones. Let it be within the competence of
the DM.
The suggested 2-criteria (H+B) rule for NPCU may consist of the following steps:
(1) Determine α and β (subjectively or on the basis of psychological tests). If α ∈
[0, 0.5), then α = αo, β = βo (αo and βo are optimist’s coefficients). If α ∈
(0.5, 1], then α = αp, β = βp (αp and βp are pessimist’s coefficients).
(2) Define qmin = Dmin , qmax = Dmax , m, n and the set of alternatives (A).
(3) Estimate prices c1,c2, c3, compute b, s and generate the profit matrix.
(4) Find a non-increasing sequence of gains Sq j = (a1, j , . . . , at, j , . . . , az, j ) for
each order: at, j ≥ at+1, j (t = 1, . . ., z−1), z—number of terms in the sequence,
t—number of the term in the sequence.






j depending on parameter
α). If α ∈ (0.5, 1], calculate hbpj (index for pessimists) according to Eq. (7). If
α ∈ [0, 0.5), compute hboj (index for optimists) following formula (8). If α = 0.5,
calculate hb05j using Eq. (9), where b jdenotes the Bayes criterion, i.e. the average
of all payoffs.
hbpj =
αp · az, j + βp · ∑z−1t=1 at, j
αp + (z − 1) · βp (7)
hboj =
αo · ∑zt=2 at, j + βo · a1, j
(z − 1) · αo + βo (8)







The denominators in Eqs. (7–8) are introduced so that the final value of particular
indices belongs to interval [w j , Mj ], where w j and Mj are the values of Wald
criterion and maximax criterion, respectively, i.e. the last (az, j ) and the first (a1, j )
term of Sq j . Denominators are not crucial—they can be omitted when preparing
the ranking.
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(6) Choose alternative A∗j fulfilling condition (8).
A∗j = argmax
j
(hb j ) (10)
(7) If set A∗ containing decisions A∗j is a singleton set, stop the procedure (A∗j is the











ai, j − a j
)2 (12)
where σ j∗ is the standard deviation calculated for all decisions A∗j . The deviation
criterion is only applied to decisions with the highest index hb j . Nevertheless, as
it was already mentioned, if there are other decisions with indices very close to
the highest one, we recommend to compare the value of the second measure for
the whole subset containing the best strategies according to the first criterion.
In the last part of Sect. 4 we would like to explain in detail terms and equations
given in steps 5 and 7 of the algorithm presented above.
The assignment of parameters α and β to particular payoffs, depending on the
level of optimism (see Eqs. 7–9, step 5), is justified in Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a)
where the author suggests a significantmodification of the classicalHurwicz’s decision
rule and adds to that procedure some features characteristic of Bayes rule. That is
why, the approach proposed in Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a) is a one-criterion hybrid
of Hurwicz and Bayes rules. In the aforementioned article as well as in Gaspars-
Wieloch (2014c) we can find examples for which the original Hurwicz decision rule
leads to illogical choices because it does not take into consideration the dispersion
of payoffs. Let us analyze the following case in order to illustrate the drawback of
Hurwicz rule. The DM should select one out of two alternatives A1 and A2 with
payoffs (5,1,1,1,1,1) and (1,4.8, 4.7, 4.6, 4.5, 4.4) respectively. If the DM is amoderate
optimist, let us say α = 0.4 and β = 0.6, Hurwicz rule will recommend A1 since
H1 = 0.4 ·1+0.6 ·5 = 3.4 and H2 = 0.4 ·1+0.6 ·4.8 = 3.28. Note that this choice is
quite astonishing because our DM is not a radical optimist. Hence, he or she ought to
look for a safer decision, i.e. an alternative which gives relatively good results not only
if the best scenario occurs, but also if other states take place. The answer suggested by
Hurwicz rule results from the fact that the procedure takes into account extreme values
only and not the specificity of the whole set of gains. That example was an incentive
to modify the original approach so that it suggests rational decision variants for any
decision problem. In Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a) the author gets to the point that if the
index value should depend on all payoffs (not only on the extreme ones), parameters
α and β have to be assigned to all of them (not only to the extreme ones) and such
a feature is typical of Bayes rule. In connection with the fact that a radical optimist
rather focuses on the highest payoff, a radical pessimist rather focuses on the smallest
payoff and a moderate DM mainly analyzes intermediate profits, the assignment of
coefficients is supposed to be different, depending on the DM’s nature. Therefore, in
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the author’s opinion, in the case of optimists the high coefficient of optimism should
be assigned to a j,max and the small coefficient of pessimism should be assigned to
the remaining gains (optimists expect the occurrence of the best scenario, so it should
have the biggest weight). In the case of pessimists the high α ought to be multiplied
by a j,min and the small β ought to be multiplied by the other profits. In the case of
moderate DMs with parameters α = β = 0.5, it does not matter which Eq. (7 or
8) will be applied, since the use of both of them boils down to equal weights for
each gain. The approach described above allows one to take into consideration the
frequency of extreme (or nearly extreme) values. Of course, we may ask a question,
why parameters α and β should be assigned to particular payoffs in the way described
above. The answer is that if we assign them in an inverse way, i.e. for optimists the low
α to a j,min and the high β to the other profits, and for pessimists the low β to a j,max
and the high α to the remaining gains, we will assume that the pessimist expects, apart
from the lowest one, the occurrence of quite high profits (without the highest one)
and that the optimist, apart from the highest one, expects the occurrence of quite low
profits (without the lowest one), which is illogical.
The idea of the hybrid presented in Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a) is to recommend for
a strong pessimist an alternative with a relatively high payoff a j,min or with quite
frequent payoffs (almost) equal to a j,max . On the other hand, that rule suggests for an
strong optimist an alternative with the highest (or almost the highest) payoff a j,max ,
but its highest payoffs do not have to be frequent.
It is worth emphasizing that in the procedure proposed in Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a)
the index value depends on the number of states of nature, which is not the case of
Hurwicz rule. For pessimists, when the set of scenarios increases, the importance
of payoff a j,min in the index decreases and the significance of the remaining profits
increases. On the other hand, for optimists, the importance of payoff a j,max decreases
and the significance of the remaining profits increases. Hence, again, we can observe
the impact of Bayes rule in the analyzed hybrid, because the chance of the occurrence
of a given event decreases along with the growth of the number of states of nature.
One of the advantages of the hybrid described in Gaspars-Wieloch (2014a) is the
fact that for extreme optimists (β = 1) and extreme pessimists (α = 1) solutions
recommended by that procedure are the same as those suggested by Hurwicz rule.
In this contribution, we use the term “appropriate solution” or “suitable solution”
(step 7) to describe an alternative which maximizes the hb j index value and which,
in case of the occurrence of multiple solutions, minimizes the standard deviation
calculated merely for decisions with the highest index. Thus, note that the adjective
“appropriate” is not related to the real profit gained by the newsvendor, but it is
connected with the DM’s nature. “Appropriate” means “which suits to his or her
degree of optimism/pessimism”.
It is assumed in this article that an appropriate solution for radical pessimists is an
alternative for which:
– the smallest gain is bigger, equal or almost as big as the smallest gains of the
remaining decisions, and/or
– the subset of gains almost equal to a j,max is numerous,
123
Newsvendor problem under complete uncertainty: a case of...
since the pessimist fears the worst, regardless of the decision selected, and that is why,
such a DM needs an alternative which is attractive even if the worst state occurs and
which gives a feeling of security.
We also assume that a suitable solution for radical optimists is an alternative for
which:
– the highest gain is bigger, equal or almost as big as the highest gains of the remain-
ing decisions, and
– the subset of gains almost equal to a j,maxdoes not need to be numerous,
since the optimist is almost or even completely sure that, regardless of the decision
selected, the best scenario will occur.
To sum up, the more the DM is an optimist, the more the rule favours alternatives
with the highest payoff a j,max (no matter what the remaining gains connected with
those decisions are). On the other hand, the more the DM is a pessimist, the more
the rule favours variants with the highest payoff a j,min (no matter what the remaining
gains connected with those decisions are).
5 Illustrative examples
In this section we are going to solve several problems (Examples 1–8) by means
of the 2-criteria (H+B) rule. The first four examples are based on data presented in
Table 3 (first column), but each example analyzes a different type of DM. The next
four examples also refer to the same initial data (Table 3, first column), but this time
the number of scenarios is not equal to the number of alternatives.
Example 1 First, we assume that the DM is almost an extreme pessimist:
(1) α = 0.9, β = 0.1. Thus α = αp, β = βp.
(2) qmin = Dmin = 1, qmax = Dmax = 4, m = n = 4, A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}.
(3) c1 = 6,c2 = 11, c3 = 5. Hence b = 5, s = 1. The profit matrix is given in Table 3
(first column).
(4) Sq1 = (5, 5, 5, 5), Sq2 = (10, 10, 10, 4), Sq3 = (15, 15, 9, 3), Sq4 =
(20, 14, 8, 2).
(5) Indices hbpj are calculated in the following way:
hbp1 =
0.9 · 5 + 0.1 · (5 + 5 + 5)
0.9 + 3 · 0.1 = 5.0;
hbp2 =
0.9 · 4 + 0.1 · (10 + 10 + 10)
0.9 + 3 · 0.1 = 5.5; hb
p
3 = 5.5; hbp4 = 5.0
(6) There are two alternatives A∗j : A∗ = {A2, A3} (see Eq. 10).
(7) Set A∗ is not a singleton set. Thus, it is necessary to compute σ j∗ : σ2 = 3.0,
σ3 = 5.74. Decision A2 is the appropriate alternative (A∗∗j ) since it has the
highest index hbpj (in set A) and the lowest standard deviation (in set A
∗). The
order quantity should be equal to 2.
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Table 4 Example 5:
qmin < Dmin (qmin = 1,
Dmin = 2, qmax = Dmax = 4).
Source: Prepared by the author
Example 5 b = 5, s = 1
Sc.\alt. A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 5 10 9 8
S2 5 10 15 14
S3 5 10 15 20
Example 2 Now, let us analyze the same case (Table 3, first column) for a moderate
decision maker: α = 0.5, β = 0.5. Indices hb j are calculated as follows:
hb1 = 5 + 5 + 5 + 5
4
= 5.0; hb2 = 4 + 10 + 10 + 10
4
= 8.5; hb3 = 10.5; hb4 = 11
There is one alternative A∗j : A∗ = {A4}. Assume that the DM does not treat value 10.5
(hb3) as very close to 11 (hb4). Hence, decision A4 is the appropriate alternative. The
order quantity should be equal to 4.
Example 3 If the problem is still described by Table 3 (first column) and the decision
maker is a moderate pessimist with parameters, e.g. α = 0.62, β = 0.38, indices are
equal to hbp1 = 5, hbp2 = 8.339, hbp3 = 10, 018, hbp4 = 10, 036. As a matter of fact,
set A∗ = {A4} is a singleton. Nevertheless, index hbp for alternative A3 is almost
equal to the highest value. Therefore, the DM may want to take into consideration
that decision in the last step of the procedure. We compute the standard deviation:
σ3 = 5.74, σ3 = 7.75. The order quantity should be equal to 3.
Example 4 If the DM is almost a radical optimist, e.g. α = 0.1 (and profits are equal
to values presented in Table 3, first column), then indices hboj are equal to 5, 9.5, 13.5
and 17, respectively. In that case, decision A4 ought to be the best one.
In the first part of this section, we have considered only situations where qmin =
Dmin , qmax = Dmax , since step 2 of the decision rule is based on such an assumption.
However, it is quite interesting to analyze other cases for which: qmin < Dmin , qmin >
Dmin , qmax < Dmax , qmax > Dmax , see Examples 5–8.
Example 5 Example 5 (Table 4) concerns the casewhereqmin < Dmin ,qmax = Dmax .
Parameters qmin = 1, Dmin = 2, qmax = Dmax = 4 signify that the DM treats three
demand quantities as possible (2,3,4), but he or she is willing to order less than the
lowest demand (1 < 2). Note that in such circumstances decision A1(q = qmin) will
be always dominated by A2(q = qmin + 1), since a1,2 > a1,1, a2,2 > a2,1 etc. Thus,
there is no need to add in the analysis an order quantity lower than the lowest possible
demand quantity, since neither 2-criteria (H+B) rule nor other rules will recommend
that order quantity.
Example 6 Example 6 (Table 5) is related to the case qmin > Dmin , qmax = Dmax .
Parameters qmin = 2, Dmin = 1, qmax = Dmax = 4 mean that the decision maker
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Table 5 Example 6:
qmin > Dmin (qmin = 2,
Dmin = 1, qmax = Dmax = 4).
Source: Prepared by the author
Example 6 b = 5, s = 1
Sc.\alt. A1 A2 A3
S1 4 3 2
S2 10 9 8
S3 10 15 14
S4 10 15 20
Table 6 Example 7:
qmax < Dmax (qmin = 1,
Dmin = 1, qmax = 3,
Dmax = 4). Source: Prepared by
the author
Example 7 b = 5, s = 1
Sc.\alt. A1 A2 A3
S1 5 4 3
S2 5 10 9
S3 5 10 15
S4 5 10 15
does not intend to consider the order quantity equal to the lowest possible demand
quantity, which entails a natural elimination of the best strategy for a radical pessimist.
Nevertheless, especially for newsvendors-optimists, such an approach is justifiable.
Example 7 Example 7 (Table 6) is devoted to the case: qmax < Dmax , qmin = Dmin .
Parameters qmin = 1, Dmin = 1, qmax = 3, Dmax = 4 signify that the decision maker
does not want to take into account the order quantity equal to the highest possible
demand quantity, which, this time, entails a natural elimination of the best strategy for
an extreme optimist. Hence, especially for newsvendors-pessimists, such an approach
is also justifiable.
Example 8 Finally, Example 8 (Table 7) is connected with the case: qmax > Dmax ,
qmin = Dmin . Parameters qmin = 1, Dmin = 1, qmax = 4, Dmax = 3 mean that the
DM treats three demand quantities as possible (1,2,3), but he or she is willing to order
more than the highest demand (4 > 3). Note that for high values of the coefficient of
optimism, the 2-criteria (H+B) decision rule will suggest the highest order quantity
qmax . However, from a logical point of view, the choice of an order quantity exceeding
the highest possible demand quantity is quite unreasonable. Payoffs connected with
q > Dmax are smaller than payoffs related to q = Dmax .
Other examples, not presented in this contribution, could be related to the following
general case: qmin = Dmin and qmax = Dmax .
The analysis of all cases for which the maximal or minimal order quantity does
not overlap with the maximal or minimal demand quantity, respectively, allows us
to conclude that decision problems with qmin > Dmin or qmax < Dmax may be
also considered. On the other hand, decision problems for which qmin < Dmin or
qmax > Dmax should not be analyzed.
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Table 7 Example 8:
qmax > Dmax (qmin = 1,
Dmin = 1, qmax = 4,
Dmax = 3). Source: Prepared by
the author
Example 8 b = 5, s = 1
Sc.\alt. A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 5 4 3 2
S2 5 10 9 8
S3 5 10 15 14
6 Other possible approaches for NPCU: comparative analysis
As we could notice in previous sections, the non-repeated newsvendor problem with
unknown probabilities is worth investigating in the case of innovative products. We
also stated that NP under uncertainty has been already discussed in the literature,
but not on the assumption that the decision is made just for one period and that the
DM’s coefficient of optimism is taken into account in the decisionmaking process.We
suggested the use of a hybrid ofBayes andHurwicz rules supported by a supplementary
standard deviation criterion due to a very specific dispersion of payoffs. However, the
approach presented in this paper is just a suggestion.
In this section we will have the opportunity to compare the results obtained by
means of diverse decision rules designed for one-shot decisions and enabling one to use
the coefficients of optimism and pessimism, i.e. Hurwicz method, SAPO decision rule
(Gaspars-Wieloch2014c) andSF+ASmethod (Gaspars-Wieloch2015b). TheHurwicz
rule takes into account only extreme values. SAPO procedure considers averages of
the first several and the last several terms of non-increasing sequences of payoffs—
the cardinality of those subsets depend on DM’s preferences. Those averages are
multiplied by the coefficient of optimismand the coefficient of pessimism, respectively,
and some weights dependent on the cardinality of aforementioned subsets. SF+AS
method reduces the initial set of states of nature in order to make the decision on
the basis of those scenarios which correspond to the DM’s nature. In that procedure
the status (pessimistic, moderate or optimistic) of a given state of nature does not
vary depending on the alternative, but is fixed for all decisions. It is assumed that the
higher the sum of the so-called “dominance cases” for a given scenario is, the more
optimistic this scenario should be. After selecting a decision on the basis of a reduced
set of events, the chosen alternative is additionally checked in terms of the number of
its payoffs bigger than the maximal Wald criterion. The more pessimist the DM is, the
more numerous that number should be. Thus, SF+AS provides a kind of security for
pessimists and moderate DMs.
Table 8 presents rankings of decisions for the first four examples analyzed in the
contribution (Table 3, first column, b = 5, s = 1). Rankings are generated on the
basis of four procedures. In the case of SAPO method, it is additionally required
to set arbitrarily parameters dminj and d
max
j , which denote the allowable degree of
deviation from a j,min and a j,max , respectively. The cardinality of subsets of the lowest
results and the highest results is determined by two factors (degrees of deviation and
coefficients of optimism/pessimism). In the case of SF+AS, calculations are preceded
by the assignment of a suitable interval for β to each scenario (Table 9). The last
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Table 8 Results obtained for different methods (b = 5, s = 1). Source: Prepared by the author




Ex I (α = 0.9) A2 (5.5 / 3.0) A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0) S1
A3 (5.5 / 5.74) A2 (4.6) A2 (4.6) A2 (4.0)
A1 (5.0) A3 (4.2) A3 (4.2) A3 (3.0)
A4 (5.0) A4 (3.8) A4 (3.8) A4 (2.0)
Ex II (α = 0.5) A4 (11.0) A4 (11.0) A4 (12.5) A2 (10.0) S2
A3 (10.5) A3 (9.0) A3 (10.88) A3 (9.0)
A2 (8.5) A2 (7.0) A2 (9.5) A4 (8.0)
A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0)
Ex III (α = 0.62) A3 (10.02 / 5.74) A4 (8.84) A4 (10.40) A2 (8.98) S2, S1
A4 (10.04 / 7.75) A3 (7.56) A3 (8.99) A3 (7.98)
A2 (8.34) A2 (6.28) A2 (8.18) A4 (6.98)
A1 (5.00) A1 (5.00) A1 (4.70) A1 (5.0)
Ex IV (α = 0.1) A4 (17.0) A4 (18.2) A4 (18.2) A4 (20.0) S4
A3 (13.5) A3 (13.8) A3 (13.8) A3 (15.0)
A2 (9.5) A2 (9.4) A2 (9.4) A2 (10.0)
A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0) A1 (5.0)
column of Table 8 indicates states of nature on the basis of which the final decision is
made.
Results in Table 8 allow us to draw the following conclusions:
(1) For Hurwicz and SAPO methods, rankings (but not values) are the same, which
is due to the fact that both methods focus on extreme values (Hurwicz) or subsets
of extreme values (SAPO), and which is also due to a small number of states
of nature in the analyzed problem. More significant differences can be observed
when the set of scenarios increases.
(2) 2crit(H+B) is the only rule which does not recommend A1 as the best choice in
the case of α = 0.9. This rule suggests A1, but for α ≥ 0.94, i.e. for more radical
pessimists.
(3) The most visible discrepancies occur between SF+AS and the remaining rules,
which is caused by totally different initial assumptions. The last column of Table 8
clearly shows for instance that in Example 1 scenario S1 is the only one having
an impact on the final choice. Other states of nature are not taken into account.
For the sake of completeness, let us analyze Examples IX–XII for data given in
Table 3 in the last column (b = 1, s = 5), see Tables 10 and 11. Note that in the
newsvendor problem the change of parameters b and s does not affect the sum of
“dominance cases” for particular events (compare Tables 9, 11).
Results in Table 10 allow us to draw the following conclusions:
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Table 9 Payoff matrix, sums of “dominance cases” and intervals for β (for b = 5, s = 1). Source: Prepared
by the author




A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 5 4 3 2 0 [0.00, 0.14]
S2 5 10 9 8 3 ]0.43, 0.57]
S3 5 10 15 14 5 ]0.71, 0.86]
S4 5 10 15 20 6 ]0.86, 1.00]
Table 10 Results obtained for different methods (b = 1, s = 5). Source: Prepared by the author




Ex IX (α = 0.9) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0) S1
A2 (−2.5) A2 (−3.4) A2 (−3.4) A2 (−4.0)
A3 (−6.5) A3 (−7.8) A3 (−7.8) A3 (−9.0)
A4 (−11.0) A4 (−12.2) A4 (−12.2) A4 (−14.0)
Ex X (α = 0.5) A1 (1.0 / 0.00) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0) A2 (2.0) S2
A2 (0.5 / 3.00) A2 (−1.0) A2 (−0.5) A1 (1.0)
A3 (−1.5) A3 (−3.0) A3 (−2.63) A3 (−3.0)
A4 (−5.0) A4 (−5.0) A4 (−3.5) A4 (−8.0)
Ex XI (α = 0.62) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0) A1 (0.94) A1 (1.00) S2 , S1
A2 (−0.11) A2 (−1.72) A2 (−1.34) A2 (0.98)
A3 (−2.52) A3 (−4.44) A3 (−4.16) A3 (−4.02)
A4 (−6.23) A4 (−7.16) A4 (−4.64) A4 (−9.02)
Ex XII (α = 0.1) A2 (1.5 / 3.00) A4 (2.2) A4 (2.2) A4 (4.0) S4
A3 (1.5 / 5.74) A3 (1.8) A3 (1.8) A3 (3.0)
A1 (1.0) A2 (1.4) A2 (1.4) A2 (2.0)
A4 (1.0) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0) A1 (1.0)
(1) For Hurwicz and SAPO methods, rankings (but not values) are again the same
for the reasons described above.
(2) 2crit(H+B) is the only rule which does not recommend A4 as the best choice in
the case of α = 0.1. This rule suggests A4, but for α ≤ 0.06, i.e. for more radical
optimists. Such recommendations are totally justified since the order quantity
equal to 4 leads to a positive payoff only if the demand also equals 4 (or more). In
other cases that strategy leads to losses (even−14!), which is extremely undesired
(if we extend the size of the problem, let us say: qmin = Dmin = 1, qmax = Dmax =
50, then the highest loss for A50 equals −244!).
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Table 11 Payoff matrix, sums of “dominance cases” and intervals for β (for b = 1, s = 5). Source: Prepared
by the author




A1 A2 A3 A4
S1 1 −4 −9 −14 0 [0.00, 0.14]
S2 1 2 −3 −8 3 ]0.43, 0.57]
S3 1 2 3 −2 5 ]0.71, 0.86]
S4 1 2 3 4 6 ]0.86, 1.00]
In the author’s opinion each decision rule presented in Tables 8 and 10 may be
applied to decision making under complete uncertainty. However, the choice of a
suitable procedure should depend on many diverse factors:
(1) Hurwicz rule may be certainly used when the distribution of payoffs connected
with a given alternative is (almost) symmetric and decision variants have quite
similar dispersions (measured e.g. by the standard deviation).
(2) SAPO rule may be used when the distribution of payoffs connected with a given
alternative is symmetric or asymmetric. The approach is addressed to DMs who
focus on the specificity of the subsets of extreme values and who do not care about
the frequency and the level of intermediate profits. In the case of SAPO, decision
variants should have quite similar payoff dispersions.
(3) 2crit(H+B) rule may be used when the distribution of payoffs connected with
a given alternative is symmetric or asymmetric. The procedure is addressed to
DMs who are willing to analyze the specificity of the whole payoff set (range,
frequency, dispersion) and that is why, 2crit(H+B) can be even applied to decision
variants having significantly different outcome dispersions.
(4) SF+AS rule may be used when one has a strong belief in the predictive power
of one’s declared coefficient of optimism (pessimism) since in this case the alter-
native is selected on the basis of one (sometimes more) concrete state of nature.
Thus, there is a strong assumption that just that particular scenario will occur. And
in the context of one-shot decisions such an assumption is totally justifiable, but
in problems where particular decisions are characterized by considerably diverse
payoff dispersions, we encourage to apply SF+AS quite cautiously.
In connection with the conclusions made above, we venture to state that since:
– in the NP problem alternatives differ essentially from others in terms of payoff
dispersion,
– problems with innovative products are characterized by a high level of uncertainty
(because there are no historical data allowable to estimate the payoff matrix, i.e.
to estimate parameters c1, c2 and c3),
the 2-criteria (H+B) rulemaybe the best procedure, especially if theDMintends to con-
trol all profits related to a given order quantity (not some of them). However, the final
choice of a proper decision rule should depend onDM’s preferences. SF+AS is a better
approach if the DM treats payoffs connected with an alternative as a sequence (i.e. he
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Table 12 2crit(H+B) values for data given in Table 3 (2nd column, b = 3, s = 3), α ∈ [0, 1]. Source:
Prepared by the author
Alpha Alternatives Minimal profit Maximal profit
A1 A2 A3 A4
1.00 3.00 0.00 −3.00 −6.00 3 3
0.95 3.00 0.82 −1.64 −4.36 3 3
0.90 3.00 1.50 −0.50 −3.00 3 3
0.85 3.00 2.08 0.46 −1.85 3 3
0.80 3.00 2.57 1.29 −0.86 3 3
0.75 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 3 or 0 3 or 6
0.70 (3.00) 3.38 2.63 0.75 (3 or) 0 (3 or) 6
0.65 3.00 3.71 3.18 1.41 0 6
0.60 3.00 4.00 3.67 2.00 0 6
0.55 3.00 4.26 4.11 2.53 0 6
0.50 3.00 4.50 4.50 3.00 0 or −3 6 or 9
0.45 3.00 (4.58) 4.74 3.47 (0 or) −3 (6 or) 9
0.40 3.00 4.67 5.00 4.00 −3 9
0.35 3.00 4.76 5.29 4.59 −3 9
0.30 3.00 4.88 5.63 5.25 −3 9
0.25 3.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 −3 or −6 9 or 12
0.20 3.00 5.14 (6.43) 6.86 (−3 or) −6 (9 or) 12
0.15 3.00 5.31 6.92 7.85 −6 12
0.10 3.00 5.50 7.50 9.00 −6 12
0.05 3.00 5.73 8.18 10.36 −6 12
0.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 12.00 −6 12
Bold numbers represent the highest values of the 2crit(H+B) indices
or she pays attention to the position of a given outcome in the profit matrix). On the
other hand, Hurwicz, SAPO and 2crit(H+B) rules treat those payoffs as a set (the order
is not crucial—it is not important to which state of nature particular profits are related).
At the end of that section, we would like to present decisions recommended by
2crit(H+B) and Hurwicz rules for data given in Table 3, second column and α ∈ [0, 1].
Results are gathered in Tables 12 and 13. The last two columns in these tables show
the minimal and maximal available profit on condition that the suggested decision
variant is selected.
We can notice that, depending on the coefficient of pessimism, each alternative (A1,
A2, A3 or A4) may be recommended by the 2crit(H+B) procedure, while Hurwicz rule
suggests only A1 or A4 (apart from one case: α = 0.50). This is due to the fact that
2crit(H+B) indices depend on all values connected with a given decision and Hurwicz
indices depend only on extreme values. It is worth underlining that suggestions pro-
vided byHurwicz approach are quite astonishing, because according to that procedure:
– A1 is the best one for both extreme pessimists (α = 1.00) and moderate pessimists
(α = 0.51),
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Table 13 Hurwicz values for data given in Table 3 (2nd column, b = 3, s = 3). α ∈ [0, 1]. Source:
Prepared by the author
Alpha Alternatives Maximal loss Maximal profit
A1 A2 A3 A4
1.00 3.00 0.00 −3.00 −6.00 3 3
0.95 3.00 0.30 −2.40 −5.10 3 3
0.90 3.00 0.60 −1.80 −4.20 3 3
0.85 3.00 0.90 −1.20 −3.30 3 3
0.80 3.00 1.20 −0.60 −2.40 3 3
0.75 3.00 1.50 0.00 −1.50 3 3
0.70 3.00 1.80 0.60 −0.60 3 3
0.65 3.00 2.10 1.20 0.30 3 3
0.60 3.00 2.40 1.80 1.20 3 3
0.55 3.00 2.70 2.40 2.10 3 3
0.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3, 0, −3 or −6 3, 6, 9 or 12
0.45 3.00 3.30 3.60 3.90 −6 12
0.40 3.00 3.60 4.20 4.80 −6 12
0.35 3.00 3.90 4.80 5.70 −6 12
0.30 3.00 4.20 5.40 6.60 −6 12
0.25 3.00 4.50 6.00 7.50 −6 12
0.20 3.00 4.80 6.60 8.40 −6 12
0.15 3.00 5.10 7.20 9.30 −6 12
0.10 3.00 5.40 7.80 10.20 −6 12
0.05 3.00 5.70 8.40 11.10 −6 12
0.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 12.00 −6 12
Bold numbers represent the highest values of the Hurwicz indices
– A4 is the best one for both extreme optimists (α = 0.00) and moderate optimists
(α = 0.49),
– final recommendations are significantly sensitive to the coefficient of pessimism
in the interval α ∈ [0.49, 0.51].
In the case of 2crit(H+B) procedure, recommendations change more often, but those
changes are less radical. The range of possible outcomes increases gradually (not
violently) with the decrease of the coefficient of pessimism.
7 Conclusions
We formulate a new problem. i.e. the non-repeated newsvendor problem under com-
plete uncertainty (NPCU) for innovative and small life cycle products. The problem at
hand is tackled for the first time in this work. We also make an attempt to find a suit-
able procedure enabling one to recommend an appropriate alternative. The 2-criteria
(H+B) rule, proposed and described in the paper, may be a quite comfortable and
comprehensive decision tool in the newsvendor problem under complete uncertainty
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for new and small life cycle products since it takes into account DM’s preferences
and the very specific dispersion of payoffs (asymmetry, range, frequency of particular
values). It does not require any information about the likelihood (which is justifiable
in the case of innovative products) and it is rather simple to use. The 2-criteria (H+B)
rule may be helpful in any uncertain decision problem (not merely NPCU), especially
in the case of a considerable extreme payoffs differential.
In the paper, we analyzed cases for which b − s = 4, b − s = 0 and b − s = −4
(b—unit profit, s—unit loss). If we investigate problems where the absolute difference
between the unit profit and the unit loss is much higher (e.g. 10, 50, 100 or 1000). we
will just notice that the ranges of payoffs for particular alternatives increase and that
the differences between standard deviations increase as well, which only confirms the
necessity to use a procedure considering the payoff dispersion.
Wewould like to stress that in this paper we were trying to develop a proper method
for NPCU. Nevertheless, the final choice of decision rules should be in the competence
of the DM. Some decision makers may intend for instance to combine the hybrid of
Hurwicz and Bayes rule (used in this research) with an other dispersion measure
(instead of the standard deviation applied in the contribution). Other DMs may be for
example interested in using the approach suggested by Perez et al. (2015).
In the future it would be desirable to analyze extended newsvendor models in the
context of complete uncertainty, e.g. models with utility functions, models with dif-
ferent pricing policies or multi-item newsvendor models. A very interesting topic
worth investigating concerns NP with interval payoffs for each combination scenario–
alternative (i.e. demand–order). Note that there are also such NP models for which
complete uncertainty does not occur in the whole decision making process. For
instance, in the multi-period NP our knowledge about future demand increases with
time. Hence, in subsequent periods we do have historical data and we are able to esti-
mate the probability distribution. That means that in the multi-period NP (repeated
NP) with innovative products the problem is solved under complete uncertainty in the
first period and then it is solved under partial uncertainty or risk in the next periods.
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